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ABSTRACT: Multistable figures or Kippbilder combine reversibility and ir-
reversibility in an interesting way. While the so called first aspect change
introduces an irreversible split, all subsequent aspect changes can be
understood as an endless chain of reversible changes. And it is exactly
because of this complex combination of an eventful moment and an
undirected repetition of the same, Luca Di Blasi argues in his paper ‘Split-
ting Images. Understanding Irreversible Fractures Through the Aspect
Change’, that Kippbilder can provide an interesting model for under-
standing better dramatic, existential, even religious events and their con-
sequences. After discussing the specificity of the Rubin vase and its aspect
changes and focussing then on the distinction between first and further as-
pect changes, Di Blasi suggests the productive potential of the multistable
figure as model for eventful events in discussing the conversion of Paul
and his hōs mē (‘as if not’).
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SPLITTING IMAGES
Understanding Irreversible Fractures through Aspect Change
Luca Di Blasi1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Fig. 1. ‘Welche Thiere gleichen sich am meisten? Kaninchen und Ente’ (‘Which 
animals are most similar? The rabbit and the duck’) (Fliegende Blätter, 1892).
Fig. 2. ‘King of France and Family’ (L. J. Martin, 1914).
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The Rubin vase and duck-rabbit have two things in common: not only 
are they famous multistable figures, or Kippbilder, but before being dis-
covered by scientists and philosophers, they both started their career as 
simple jokes. The duck-rabbit Kippbild appeared for the first time in 
1892 in a satirical review (Fig. 1),2 and a visual jest, which contains 
four profiles of the French royal family (Fig. 2), inspired the Rubin vase 
(Fig. 3).3
 There is obviously a difference between a gag and the Damascene 
Conversion of Paul, which I will try to explain with the model of aspect 
changes at the end of this paper. A connection between all three exam-
ples lies, however, in an eventful moment, something that happens 
immediately and changes everything: the punchline, the eureka moment 
in the aspect change, the existential split in the conversion. In contrast 
to usual understandings of Kippbilder, which focus on the relationship 
between perception, cognition, and language, this paper will try to dem-
onstrate that Kippbilder can be a helpful model for understanding bet-
ter dramatic, existential, and even religious events and their conse-
quences. 
 The starting point of the first section of this paper is the assump-
tion that the aspect change of the Rubin vase is not completely analogi-
cal to the one between duck and rabbit. The Rubin vase consists in the 
close entanglement of two different aspect changes, one between faces 
and vase and one between figure and ground. The latter inverts an ini-
tial distinction and can therefore be called ‘inversional aspect change’. 
At the end of the section I will reapply – as a kind of hostile re-entry – 
these insights to the theoretical means that helped develop the notion of 
the inversional aspect change, namely George Spencer Brown’s notion 
of distinction, and indicate its limits. The moment we try to apply the 
inversional aspect change to political questions, however, we are con-
fronted with further limitations.
 In the second section, I want to discuss the aspect change of the 
duck-rabbit Kippbild, which might be specified as a ‘splitting aspect 
change’ in order to distinguish it from the inversional aspect change. 
My aim is to show that there is here a basic difference between the first 
aspect change, which introduces a split, and all subsequent aspect 
changes, and that we have to keep this difference in order to better 
understand the complexity of the Kippbild. The exclusion of further 
aspect changes necessarily leads to a deceptive overcoming of the split 
through a ‘totalitarian’ retransformation of an aspect into a ‘whole’ 
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image, although reducing the aspect change to an endless change 
between two possibilities also undervalues the split.
 Only if we understand and adhere to this complexity, I would 
claim, can we use the Kippbild as a model for dramatic, splitting events. 
In the last section, I will try to briefly suggest its potential in discussing 
the figure of Paul and his hōs mē (‘as if not’).4
1 .  M O R E  T H A N  A  D I S T I N C T I O N :  T H E  I N V E R S I O N A L  A S P E C T 
C H A N G E  O F  T H E  R U B I N  V A S E
Fig. 3. ‘Rubin vase’ (Rubin, Synsoplevede Figurer, image 3).
In this section, I am interested in the specificity of the aspect change of 
the Rubin vase and in its difference to that of the duck-rabbit. In order 
to explain it, I want to use an example, even if it is more of a metaphor 
than a precise fit, and might thus be as misleading as it is helpful. Before 
Galileo Galilei, we thought that the sun was moving around the earth; 
after him we know that it is exactly the opposite: the earth is moving 
around the sun. This sounds familiar, but what is wrong with it? In the 
case of the heliocentric notion, we have two movements that can easily 
be confused: the movement of the earth spinning (the cause of our geo-
centric understanding of the sun moving around the earth) and the 
additional movement of the earth around the sun, which has nothing to 
do with our impression of the sun moving around the earth. While it is 
true that the earth is moving around the sun, this is not the inversion of 
the impression that the sun is moving around the earth. Its inversion is 
that the earth is spinning. 
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 Something similar is going on when we compare the relation 
between the faces and the vase in the Rubin vase with the relation 
between duck and rabbit. Why? To begin with, we see (as in the case of 
the duck-rabbit) only a single figure: a vase or faces. In contrast to the 
duck-rabbit, however, after the aspect change we not only see another 
figure, but we cannot avoid becoming aware of the question of the 
ground, because what was ground before the aspect change becomes 
figure after it and vice versa. Thus we can say that the aspect change of 
the Rubin vase consists of at least three relevant distinctions: not only 
the distinction between faces and vase, but also the distinction between 
vase and ground, and its inversion, between faces and ground. 
 The duck-rabbit Kippbild is different. Here the figures change as 
well, but their relations to the ground do not. Therefore, in the case of 
the duck-rabbit Kippbild, the ground does not matter, so it normally 
remains unmarked. It is only when comparing it with the Rubin vase 
that we are (now) mentioning and noting it. But even after noting it, the 
ground of the duck does not differ from that of the rabbit. The figure–
ground relation does not change with the changing of the figures. In 
consequence, after noting the ground of the duck-rabbit we are able to 
make the same three distinctions as in the case of the Rubin vase (rab-
bit–ground, duck–ground, and the distinction between these two dis-
tinctions). However, these three distinctions remain an empty abstract 
possibility that is not grounded in a perceptional experience. The only 
relevant change here therefore remains the change from one figure to 
the other, without the parallel change of the figure–ground relation. 
Even though we can indicate and name the ground, we do not see it as a 
figure.5 
 But what exactly is the difference between naming the ground as 
ground, (changing from figure to ground) and inverting the figure–
ground relation? In order to approach this question, it might be helpful 
to leave for a moment the field of multistable figures. Let’s instead take 
another picture as an example, which looks similar to different pictures 
Rubin used and which was painted in the same year, in 1915: Kasimir 
Malevich’s famous Black Square (Fig. 4).
 
 S P L I T T I N G  I M A G E S 71
Fig. 4. Kasimir Malevich, Black Square (1915).
Like in the case of Rubin’s pictures, the tension between figure and 
ground seems to play an important role here, as its complete title Black 
Square on a White Field already indicates. By mentioning or naming 
both sides of the distinction, Malevich demonstrated awareness of the 
fact that he was dealing with a distinction. This means, in the terms of 
the logician Spencer Brown, that he crossed the boundary between the 
initial indication, the black figure, towards another side, and by naming 
it as ground or ‘white field’, he also named and indicated this other 
side. But what distinguishes this awareness of both sides of a distinction 
– figure and ground – from their inversion? 
 In contrast to Rubin’s pictures, Malevich obviously didn’t intend 
the black square as a ground. In his text ‘From Cubism and Futurism to 
Suprematism: The New Realism in Painting’, written in 1915/16,6 he 
does not mention the possibility of the inversion of figure and ground, 
and the title Black Square on a White Field even stresses the stability of 
the figure–ground relation, connecting and fixing the ground with the 
white colour and the figure with the black one. To see and to name the 
white part of the painting (‘white field’) is not enough; an inversion 
occurs only in the moment we are able to see the ground as figure (in 
this case, for example, a white window-frame, from which we can look 
into a black night).
 We can now see more clearly that crossing the indicated side of a 
distinction and naming the other side is neither equal to, nor a condi-
tion for, an inversion. Instead of inverting the original distinction, cross-
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ing the boundary rather seems to favour a second-order perspective 
from which one can name or indicate both sides of a distinction without 
necessarily having experienced an inversion. This difference becomes 
evident if we compare the stable figure–ground relation of the Black 
Square, as understood by Malevich, with another picture in Rubin’s 
book. In contrast to the Black Square, this picture is intended to let us 
perceive an inversion of figure and ground. We are expected to perform 
the inversion of an initial distinction (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Rubin, Synsoplevede Figurer, image 2.
This picture allows the distinguishing of inversion and multistability at 
the same time. In contrast to the Rubin vase, the inversion occurs here 
without the involuntary eureka moment that is typical of multistable 
figures. The eureka moment seems to be connected to the first recogni-
tion of a figure or gestalt as such, something that does not hold for the 
black and white side of Fig. 5, since these sides arguably do not belong 
to anything we would recognize. Fig. 5 thus provides the possibility of 
distinguishing not only the indication of an unmarked side and inver-
sion, but also the inversion of figure and ground from an inversional 
aspect change.
 What Rubin’s vase and his other figures share is, however, the 
potentiality to visualize that – as Niklas Luhmann has repeatedly said, 
and as follows from Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form – in operating with 
distinctions, we are dealing with asymmetrical differences.7 The two 
sides of the distinction are not symmetrical, because only one side is ini-
tially indicated. Each distinction implies first the focus of one side and 
the neglect of the other. Starting from this indication, we can then, in a 
second step, cross the boundary and mark the as yet unmarked side.8 
Rubin’s figures render this asymmetry visible because the figure–ground 
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relation is asymmetrical as well, since here the figure is privileged in the 
sense that it attracts our attention. 
 While crossing a distinction and naming its unmarked side favours 
the misunderstanding that this might be sufficient for the symmetriza-
tion of asymmetrical distinctions, the inversion provides a possibility for 
dealing with asymmetries that goes beyond such mere crossing. Because 
of its potential capacity not only to illustrate hierarchical differences, 
but also to invert them, the inversional aspect change apparently 
favours the possibility of seeing asymmetrical distinctions, for example 
asymmetrical power relations, the other way round.
 This does not, however, mean that applying the inversional aspect 
change (and inversions in general) to politically asymmetrical (for 
example, power) relations would be unproblematic. First, the equaliza-
tion of hierarchies by complementing one hierarchy with the opposite 
one might be interpreted as the anticipation of an equality to come, but 
it might also appear ambivalent because such a (symbolic) anticipation 
to a certain degree obscures existing hierarchies. Second (and more rele-
vant), while, for example, deconstruction can be read as a strategy of 
fighting existing hierarchies without falling into the trap of reproducing 
the basic asymmetry, this seems to be exactly what the inversional 
aspect change leads to. The basic asymmetrical distinction is not scruti-
nized by it. Instead of deconstructing or questioning this asymmetry, the 
inversional aspect change perpetuates it by inverting it. Finally, what the 
inversional aspect change is not providing is the experience of the other 
aspect as figure (subject) and as devalued at the same time. It permits 
perception of the ‘ground’ as figure, but only by reducing at the same 
time the former figures in the ground.
2 .  O U T  O F  T H E  B L U E  –  D U C K - R A B B I T :  T H E  S P L I T T I N G 
A S P E C T  C H A N G E
Starting from the analysis of the difference between the Rubin vase and 
the duck-rabbit Kippbild, I tried in the first section to figure out the dif-
ference between distinction and inversion. The analysis finally led me to 
what might be designated as a basic characteristic of Kippbilder, namely 
the so-called eureka moment, the involuntary aspect change. 
 In this second section, I would now like to focus on this eureka 
moment, not psychologically (as the time interval between one aspect 
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and the other),9 but rather structurally as an eventful split that changes 
everything. In order to do so, I will look at the aspect change genealogi-
cally and, so to speak, in super slow motion. Also, I will turn towards 
the duck-rabbit Kippbild, but not because of its philosophical reputa-
tion (acquired through Ludwig Wittgenstein’s extensive discussion of 
the figure in his Philosophische Untersuchungen).10 Rather, since the 
duck-rabbit Kippbild is somehow simpler than the Rubin vase, it per-
mits us to focus on the change from one aspect to another without a 
parallel (and easily confusing) inversion of figure and ground. 
 Since I am more interested in the Kippbild as a structural model for 
the description of events and their consequences than as a model for the 
connection between language, perception, and cognition, I will use the 
term ‘aspect’ in the sense of a relativization and ignore other possible 
meanings. (In line with this formalization, I will symbolize the aspects 
with abstract figures like the semicircle and the rectangle in Fig. 6.) At 
the same time, I will juxtapose this formalization with a certain drama-
tization in order to constantly foreshadow the model’s potential possi-
bilities applications to existential, and even religious, events and their 
consequences.
 Prima facie, the relation of the aspects is both symmetrical and cir-
cular. No linearity, no progress occurs: only the endless change from 
one aspect to the other, from one side of the distinction to the other. 
While this is true, it is certainly far from being an exhaustive descrip-
tion. Seen in a genealogical way, we do not start with two aspects – a 
duck and a rabbit – since we do not start seeing two aspects immedi-
ately (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6.
Nor do we have first one aspect, and then a second one. The notion of 
the aspect in which I am interested here already implies a relativity that 
at the very beginning is not yet given. We have, first, what appears as 
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one (a whole picture), and then, after we see the ‘second aspect’, we 
have two aspects.11 But this does not mean that we have first a whole, 
which is then simply divided into two aspects (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7.
Rather, we have something like this (Fig. 8): First we have a whole (the 
larger circle), and then the sudden introduction of something new (the 
black square), which is completely different from what now appears as 
the ‘first aspect’. (In the following I will do without quotation marks, 
even though one should bear in mind the problematic use of the terms 
‘first aspect’ and ‘second aspect’.) This new aspect is not connected to 
the first aspect, save through its power to split and transform it retro-
spectively into an aspect. And vice versa: calling something an aspect 
when it comes out of the blue and is not dialectically connected to the 
former whole, already implies a connection or relation to the relativized 
whole. We have here a reciprocal relativization of the former whole, 
which appears as a first aspect through the emergence of something 
new, which in turn can itself only be read as a second aspect through 
the relativization of the first aspect. In this sense, the very notion of the 
aspect (again, in a purely formal understanding) implies a reciprocal 
aspectualization and relativization, and thus a relation. At the same 
time, both aspects keep an independence one from the other, and do not 
appear as halves of a comprehensive whole that require supplementa-
tion. Such a whole does not exist anymore, and therefore both aspects 
cannot really be called parts.
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Fig. 8.
In Fig. 8, this transformation of the former whole into a mere aspect is 
indicated by a reduction of the circle’s size; the – slightly different – 
interdependence between the second aspect and the former whole is 
indicated by the double arrow between them. The first aspect change is 
thus the moment of a break and reciprocal ‘aspectualization’, which 
changes everything. 
 However, Fig. 8 is not yet precise enough, since it does not take 
into account that after this retroactive aspectualization of the former 
whole, this whole disappears. The moment we see the second aspect, 
the whole becomes inaccessible; it is gone, eliminated, or more precisely, 
it is there only as a reminder of something lost. (This transformation is 
suggested in Fig. 9 through the pale colour of the big circle.) And this 
means that this wholeness can become relevant and an object of desire 
or nostalgia only after the split, which, again, is not a split of itself into 
two, but rather a split by the appearance of something different. But 
what is remarkable is that this wholeness appears neither as purely con-
structed (there was integrity, a whole, before) nor as something that was 
simply already there, since what appeared as integrity and wholeness 
actually turned out to be only limited. Even if one were to go one step 
further and claim that before the aspects there was no whole (since the 
notion of the whole always implies parts, or in our case, aspects12), then 
one would have to say that the multistable figure is initially a ‘whole’ 
that is not a whole, and then after the aspect change consists of ‘parts’ 
that are not parts.
 By means of the aspect change, we are able to demonstrate a mis-
understanding full of consequences that can arise at the very moment of 
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the split/loss of the whole. The wholeness has not only become inacces-
sible and thereby possibly an object of desire in the very moment of its 
disappearance; there is also almost necessarily the danger of imagining 
it in the shape of what once appeared as an intactness, but turned out to 
be only an incomplete aspect. Imagining the intactness in the shape of 
the first aspect means privileging, mystifying, and totalizing one (contin-
gent) particularity: the contingency of the first. While denying the integ-
rity altogether does not take into account the experience and persistence 
(in the form of a memory of this experience) of the lost integrity, its 
vi sualization tends to be bound to the lost whole (the first aspect) and 
necessarily falls into the totalitarian trap. The whole is imagined 
through what turned out to be particular. 
 The converse is also true: even after the reduction/relativization of 
the former whole, one might be tempted to perceive its relativized 
remainder – the first aspect – as a particular, but nevertheless excep-
tional, representative or reminder of the lost integrity. Here the first 
aspect becomes a symbol of the isolated, limited, undivided, and sacred 
exception inside a world broken into parts. (This double temptation is 
suggested in Fig. 9 in the way that the symbol of the lost integrity and 
of the first aspect share the form of a circle, and thus continue to be 
connected even after the appearance of the new aspect, when it has 
become evident that the circle, in excluding, so to speak, the square, 
cannot be the right symbol of a totality or integrity.)
Fig. 9.
But there is a parallel risk: There is not only a special relation between 
the first aspect and the lost integrity, but also one between the second 
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aspect and the split. The second aspect is ambivalent. It can be under-
stood as something distinct and new, but at the same time it has to be 
equally understood as something that splits the situation and relativizes 
the former whole – and in consequence necessarily itself – into a mere 
aspect. Therefore, even though the first aspect is no less connected to 
the division than the second aspect, the latter appears more related to 
the split condition. 
 In this sense, it is not enough to say that the appearance of another 
aspect provokes a richer understanding of the world, since after it we 
were able to see the world from an additional perspective. Even though 
this is true, it is also true that it is exactly this new aspect that reduces 
retroactively what appeared as a whole to an aspect. It is (not exclu-
sively, but also) because of this prior reduction that the introduction of 
a new aspect appears as enriching. We did not have first one, and then 
two; we had first one (a whole), and then a split of the whole by the 
appearance of something else, and thus one that is more and less at the 
same time. We have neither an addition, nor a division; we have neither 
one added to another nor one divided into two, but one divided by 
another. Thus we have more (another) and less (the split and the recip-
rocal aspectualization) at the same time. The split and the impossibility 
of coming back to a simple whole, or a state of integrity, is the price for 
the addition of aspects and views. 
 Even though both aspects of a Kippbild are closely connected, the 
relation between both is – as already suggested – not completely sym-
metrical. The first aspect is not necessarily connected with the second 
one. Someone might simply not see the second aspect, and then there is 
for him no aspectualization and relativization (and Kippbild) at all. In 
this case, there is not only no second aspect, but neither is there a first 
one. We have the intactness, that’s all. (This very possibility might limit 
any attempt to overcome particularism. Since there is always at least the 
theoretical possibility that someone does not experience the aspect 
change – what Wittgenstein called ‘aspect blindness’ – there are no 
means to force him or her to accept it. In consequence, there is always 
the possibility of just simulating – towards others and/or towards one-
self – aspect blindness and thereby defending a position that turned out 
to be limited or particular.) 
 In the case of the second aspect, things are more complicated. Its 
status is from the very beginning paradoxical because it is not only 
between being a whole and an aspect; this very ambivalence lets it 
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appear as representative of the new condition of the (split) whole. The 
new aspect can somehow be separated from the old one because it 
comes ‘out of the blue’ (it was neither predictable nor deductible from 
the first aspect), but not completely because it is also true that it comes 
‘out of the duck’ or ‘out of the rabbit’. Because of this specificity, the 
second aspect is less than the first aspect (it was never a whole image) 
and more at the same time: in its own dividing dividedness (between 
independence from and splitting relation to the former whole), it per-
forms and represents the split and the splitting, and thus the new condi-
tion (the new whole), which consists exactly in the split. 
 This complicated relation between first and second aspect requires 
further aspect changes in order to persist. Stopping the aspect change on 
the side of the first aspect would retrospectively make the emergence of 
the new appear as the emergence of a mere phantom. Instead of an 
aspect change, we would rather have the short appearance of something 
else that immediately disappeared again. If the Kippbild stabilizes on 
the side of the second aspect, we would have either the gradual 
(although perhaps never-ending) replacement of the old integrity 
through a new one, or (as frequently occurs in religious conversions) its 
radical retrospective revaluation (e.g. the negativization of the life 
before the conversion as sinful). In both cases, stopping the aspect 
change would be equivalent either to a decision in favour of a limited 
but stable, less exhaustive but also less exhausting aspect, or to an 
attempt to ‘retotalize’ an aspect to a (deceptive) whole. This is the rea-
son that the aspect changes that follow the first one are relevant: they 
accomplish the reciprocal aspectualization and guarantee the persistence 
of the split by making the stabilization of one aspect impossible. 
 In order to get an adequately complex description of the aspect 
change, we have thus to understand the importance of the further 
aspect changes and to preserve the difference from the first one: only 
the latter introduces a new element or aspect and a split, and at the 
same time reduces the former image by transforming it into an aspect. 
Moreover, only in the first aspect change does something like an event 
really occur. The first aspect change is not a matter of decision or inten-
tion. It could arguably occur even without knowing that there is 
another aspect. While the further aspect changes may become somehow 
intentional, the first one is the occurrence of something we can experi-
ence (or not), but cannot choose or even anticipate voluntarily. This is 
why only this first aspect change bears the quality of a eureka moment, 
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a proto-epiphany, and no one can really expect someone else to experi-
ence it. The disregard of the further aspect changes restabilizes one of 
both aspects and leads to the totalitarization of one aspect. Ignoring the 
difference between first and further aspect changes, in contrast, rein-
scribes the first aspect change retrospectively in a chain of normalized 
and banal repetition of more and more voluntarily executable, endless, 
and senseless aspect changes from one aspect to the other and back, 
transforming it thus into something like a drawing of distinctions. In 
other words, the complexity of the aspect change vanishes if we stabi-
lize it by stopping it at a certain moment, but it also vanishes if we 
reduce it to an endless and senseless repetition. 
 Between the dramatic first aspect change and the normalized one, 
there is another relevant aspect change that mediates between both. The 
Kippbild as Kippbild does not start immediately with the experience of 
something new – the first aspect change – but rather with the ‘return’ to 
the first aspect (which indeed is not a return, but a change into some-
thing new, in so far as it is, again, not the return to a whole, but to a 
relativized aspect). Only at this moment can we really start speaking of 
a Kippbild, because as long as there is no ‘return’, the whole dynamics 
of the aspect change has not yet been developed; instead, we have a 
change from one state to another. The second aspect change initiates the 
normalization of the dramatic eureka moment into the endless repeti-
tion of aspect changes.
 One consequence of this understanding is that inside the Kippbild 
model there is one possibility for making a decision. This is not self-evi-
dent, because the Kippbild model does not seem to provide any choice 
at all: the first aspect change is eventful and not a matter of decision. 
The event (the first aspect change) is so dramatic exactly because it 
changes any former condition, so that after it, we cannot switch 
between a former situation (whole, integrity) and a new one (aspect, 
split). After the split, the former situation (the whole) simply does not 
exist anymore as a whole, but only as an aspect. And an endless repeti-
tion of aspect changes cannot provide any possibility for deciding 
between either aspect. 
 Nevertheless, there is still a possibility for deciding, but it lies nei-
ther in choosing between one aspect and the other, nor in choosing 
between split and not split. The only choice we have is to accept (or 
not) the complexity of the aspect change, or, translated into an existen-
tial sphere, to accept (or reject) the split and at the same time the desire 
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for getting rid of it. Only the adherence of both the notion of a lost 
integrity and the persistence of the split can cover the complexity of the 
situation. Even if for practical reasons we are forced to opt for one or 
the other, this decision cannot fundamentally change the situation. For 
example, even if we go on living in the apparently same conditions as 
before the event (an option that might be privileged by fidelity and/or 
by a certain conservative tendency against a complete change of circum-
stances), after the split it would result in self-deception if we tried to 
imagine this condition (the first aspect) as still integrated. 
 The same is true, however, for the decision in favour of the splitting 
second aspect. This option is encouraged by the fact that the new aspect 
reveals the narrowness of what now appears retrospectively as an inte-
grated whole, and bears the power of a completely unfolded potential-
ity, the magic of a new and renewing beginning. Since the second aspect 
provides the illusion of better representing the new (split) whole (as the 
first aspect provides the illusion of representing a still integrated one) it 
is particularly fascinating – but only as long as there is no decision in 
favour of it. Opting for the new aspect is equivalent to the attempt to 
replace a lost whole through a new (totalitarian) whole. In this case, it 
is the neglect of this split and splitting character of the new aspect – 
split between whole and aspect, between independence and relation to 
the other aspect – that would necessarily lead to limiting it to exactly 
what it revealed the first one to be. 
 But what is more, even opting for the split (by which, again, the 
second aspect appears more closely connected than the first one) as 
split, its affirmation is paradoxically equivalent to the attempt to get rid 
of it (and, in existential terms, its pain) through the cancellation of the 
very idea of something like integrity and the transformation of the split 
into repetition. This can be related to the endless aspect change, even 
though the Kippbild is here in that sense limited and misleading, as it 
suggests an endless aspect change between two aspects rather than 
between always different ones.
 In short, the only decision that respects the complexity of the 
aspect change lies in the refusal of two different kinds of reduction. One 
consists of negating the split, in trying to stop the aspect change – mak-
ing a decision in favour of one aspect and thereby hoping to finally get 
rid of the split altogether. The striving for the ‘final dissolution’ of any 
split and thus tension might remind us of the Nirvana principle as pro-
posed by Sigmund Freud. The other, more complicated, option consists 
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in the affirmation or revaluation of the split and the denial of any integ-
rity at all – the striving to get rid of the very notion of any reminder of a 
lost integrity. This option is not directly reductive, in so far as the 
intactness indeed no longer exists, but it easily leads to the reduction of 
the aspect change by mastering it. We walk here a fine line between 
accepting the split and transforming it in an active attitude, becoming 
more and more able to perform the split actively, and transforming 
what initially was passivity into a splitting activity. The field ranges 
from the distinction between passive and active nihilism, and 
Nietzsche’s ambivalent attempt to overcome both with his notion of the 
‘ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’ (‘Eternal Recurrence of the Same’) to 
Freud’s ‘fort/da’ and obscure aspects of Žižek’s (death) drive.13
3 .  H ō S  M Ē
The aspect change, as described here, seems to provide an interesting 
model for the analysis of relevant – and this means irreversible – 
changes, especially for irreversible, eventful changes provoked by the 
appearance of something new (what we described as a second aspect). 
In order to apply the inversional as well as splitting aspect change, I will 
very briefly try to read the Paulinian conversion and his subsequent 
position between Judaism and Christianity, as well as his notion of the 
hōs mē, as developed by Giorgio Agamben, through the Kippbild model. 
 As is well known, Paul was a devout and even fanatic Pharisee who 
combated Christians before he converted to being one of them: ‘[…] cir-
cumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benja-
min, a Hebrew of Hebrews; as to the law, a Pharisee; as to zeal, a perse-
cutor of the church; as to righteousness under the law, blameless’ (Phil 
3, 5–6).14 The Damascene Conversion, as described by the Acts of the 
Apostles, was a splitting event, an eventful encounter with Jesus Christ. 
This dramatic encounter, however, was not an encounter with some-
thing completely new: he already knew the other side of the distinction 
and had a name for it. The described Damascene Conversion was more 
than simply crossing the boundary of a distinction and naming the 
other side, and presumably more than a simple inversion, since with his 
conversion, Paul not only saw, in terms of the inversional model we 
described earlier, Christ and the Christians ‘as figures’, as subjects; 
becoming Christ, he also perceived them from their own side, as victims 
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of persecution. Paul switched to the position of the persecuted without 
becoming a persecutor of the former persecutors, without simply invert-
ing the hierarchies. 
 The term ‘conversion’ is, however, somehow problematic: Paul 
converted to an abject side – something that nowadays might recall the 
term ‘perversion’ – rather than to a well-established and more or less 
respectable institution. In order to maintain the richness of what hap-
pened here, one might try to combine both terms (conversion/perver-
sion) in order to mutually enrich them. At the same time, he converted 
in an unfolded field that was not yet developed (there were already 
Christians, but there was no real Christianity yet, let alone an organized 
church). 
 The very problem of understanding Paul consists therefore exactly 
in the uncertainty as to what extent we can already imagine the conver-
sion as a movement towards something new, inasmuch as it rather con-
sisted in the split and change (relativization) of a given situation (what 
after the split appears as Paul’s ‘Judaism’ before). And this is exactly the 
reason that the splitting aspect change is so interesting here. As I have 
tried to show, the occurrence of something new (a new aspect) is inher-
ently connected to the split and relativization of the former condition. 
Indeed, according to Paul, the messianic event consists in a split of all 
former positions and identities in themselves. After the event, everything 
is ‘as if not’, hōs mē.
What I mean, brothers, is that the time is short. From now on those who 
have wives should live as if they had none; those who mourn, as if they did 
not; those who are happy, as if they were not; those who buy something, 
as if it were not theirs to keep; those who use the things of the world, as if 
not engrossed in them. For this world in its present form is passing away. 
(1 Cor 7, 29–30.)
As Giorgio Agamben has developed it in his book Il tempo che resta 
(2000), hōs mē is the best definition of messianic life. The consequence 
of the messianic event is a radically different identification of one’s situ-
ation. This extends to ownership structures, professions, intimate social 
systems, and institutions like matrimony. Each state is split and brought 
into tension with itself. For Agamben, hōs mē is the formula of this split. 
‘The messianic vocation is the revocation of every vocation.’15 The hōs 
mē is thus, if we follow Agamben, anything but a happy, liberated con-
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dition. Quite the opposite, it is the condition of intensity and inner ten-
sion that follows from the occurrence of a messianic event.16
 Relating to Paul himself, his ‘Christianity’ would not simply consist 
of the choice of something new, a new identity that at this time has not 
yet been established. (Paul never speaks of Christianity.) Neither would 
it simply consist in the split of a given situation, the split of ‘Judaism’ 
itself (because what is called ‘Judaism’ after Christianity is the product 
of a relativization and of a retroactive change). Rather, we have here the 
very connection of both: the split of an intactness (what retrospectively 
appears as ‘Judaism’) through an event, something new. ‘Christianity’, 
especially in this initial state, but to a certain extent to this day (since it 
never followed the temptation to get rid of the ‘Old Testament’), is not 
simply something completely different from ‘Judaism’, something that 
could be isolated from it, but rather the apparently paradoxical – but 
via the model of the aspect change, nevertheless understandable – con-
nection of something new that splits and relativizes a former condition. 
 The Kippbild model can thus provide a model that overcomes a 
deep tension between the main current philosophical interpretations of 
Paul: while Agamben – and this holds even more for Jacob Taubes17 – 
views Paul as belonging essentially to Judaism and tends to interpret 
Paulinian Christianity as the consequence of the introduction of a split 
in the Jewish tradition, Alain Badiou, another major contemporary phi-
losopher who wrote a book on Paul,18 on the contrary tends to view 
Paul exclusively as the militant subject of a new event and its conse-
quences.19 Somehow similar to Marcion, who wanted to strictly sepa-
rate Christianity from Judaism and thus represented the eternal Chris-
tian temptation to create an identity isolated from Judaism, Badiou is 
much more interested in Christianity as the beginning of something 
completely new, rather than as something that from the very beginning 
was connected with ‘Judaism’ by splitting, relativizing, and in this sense 
somehow producing it. 
 This is not the place to unfold all the possibilities that arise the 
moment we try to adapt the aspect change to Paul’s conversion as well 
as to his contemporary interpreters. I just want to suggest that the Kipp-
bild model, by providing the occurrence of something (the second 
aspect) that comes simultaneously ‘out of the blue’ and ‘out of the duck/
rabbit’ (out of a given condition, which the second aspect retroactively 
splits and relativizes), and by providing something we initially experi-
ence rather than perform, offers a very interesting new possibility for 
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interpreting Paul’s Damascene Conversion in a way that covers opposite 
interpretations: yes, Paul indeed converted to a new condition, but this 
condition introduced a split into the former whole at the same time, rel-
ativizing it, and in turn this new condition cannot be isolated or fully 
embraced without reducing it again. One formal reason that Paul keeps 
provoking tensions after two thousand years may lie in the complex 
interconnection between the split and relativization of a given situation 
and the decision in favour of, or conversion to, something new. In doing 
so, Paulinian Christianity seems to radicalize both: the split and tension, 
and in consequence the ‘messianic’ hope of overcoming it. In this read-
ing, the hōs mē might be understood as a deeply split situation that cre-
ates nostalgia for the lost integrity, and an absurd messianic hope of 
overcoming an insuperable and painful split. 
 In his demarcation against social democracy, Walter Benjamin 
described the messianic time opposed to an empty and homogeneous 
future, in which every second could be ‘die kleine Pforte, durch die der 
Messias treten konnte’ (‘the small gateway in time through which the 
Messiah might enter’).20 In the demarcation against a totalitarian misun-
derstanding of particular aspects into lost wholes and orthodox forms 
of self-particularization by playing aspect-blind, and in the demarcation 
of death-driven approaches that try to convince us that there is no loss 
and no hope, but only an endless, non-teleological repetition – which in 
turn, however, is conceptualized teleologically as the overcoming of a 
teleological religious tradition – one could similarly say: living in a split 
condition means living a life in constant and persistent tension, and in 
the hope of a (messianic) redemption that will persist through the 
impossibility of its being thought of.
N O T E S
1 My paper greatly benefited from conversations with Christoph Holzhey and his 
acute reading of it.
2 Fliegende Blätter 97.2465 (1892), p. 17 <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/
fb97/0147> [accessed 1 July 2012].
3 The so-called Rubin vase got its name from the Danish psychologist Edgar 
Rubin, who described it in his book Synsoplevede Figurer (Visual Perceivable 
Figures) in 1915. Fig. 3 is taken from this book. In a footnote, Rubin refers to a 
vase he once allegedly saw in a cabinet of curiosities, where the ‘gag’ of the 
aspect shift was applied. See Edgar Rubin, Synsoplevede Figurer: Studier i 
psykologisk Analyse (København: Gyldendal, 1915), p. 31. In this context, he 
 
 L U C A  D I  B L A S I86
mentions Lillien Jane Martin, a female pioneer in psychology who had presented 
the picture ‘King of France and Family’ (Fig. 2 in this paper) in a publication 
shortly before Rubin’s book came out. See Lillien J. Martin, ‘Über die Abhängig-
keit visueller Vorstellungsbilder vom Denken. Eine experimentelle Untersu-
chung’, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. 
Abteilung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 70.3–4 (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius 
Barth, 1914-15), pp. 212–75 (p. 214). One might thus be sceptical about the 
story of the cabinet of curiosities and suspect that this was invented by Rubin in 
order to claim priority of his own ‘discovery’.
4 I develop a similar, but more detailed inquiry of the figure of Paul through an 
interpretation of Pasolini’s script ‘San Paolo’. See Luca Di Blasi, ‘One Divided by 
Another: Split and Conversion in Pasolini’s San Paolo’, in The Scandal of Self-
Contradiction: Pasolini’s Multistable Subjectivities, Traditions, Geographies, ed. 
by Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gragnolati, and Christoph F. E. Holzhey (Vienna: 
Turia + Kant, 2012), pp. 189–207.
5 As I will show in the second section, however, the aspect change of the duck-rab-
bit is much more complicated and differentiated than it might here appear.
6 Kasimir Malevich, ‘From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Real-
ism in Painting’, in Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, 
ed. by Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 
pp. 166–76.
7 At least in the case of Luhmann, there might be a possibility of connecting his 
later thoughts to the aspect change. There is a connection (at least with regard to 
content) between the figure–ground distinction as analysed by Rubin and the fig-
ure–medium distinction as described by Fritz Heider a few years later. Luhmann, 
in turn, adopted the distinction of form and medium and reconceptualized it 
with the notion of form developed by Spencer Brown. See Niklas Luhmann, ‘The 
Paradox of Form’, in Problems of Form, ed. by Dirk Baecker (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 16–26.
8 See George Spencer Brown, Laws of Form (New York: Julian Press, 1972).
9 Referring to Wittgenstein, Fabian Goppelsröder mentions the importance of the 
very instant of the aspect change as a special moment between ‘seeing’ and ‘see-
ing as’: ‘Dieser Moment der ent-schärften Perspektive auf Welt ermöglicht eben 
jene Erfahrung der Unsicherheit zwischen den Aspekten, in welcher das “Sehen” 
noch nicht wieder zu einem “Sehen als…” fokussiert ist. Dieser Moment ist der 
Moment des Übergangs, des Aspektwechsels selbst.’ See Fabian Goppelsröder, 
Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen: Wittgensteins Weg von der literarischen zur dich-
tenden Philosophie (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), p. 80. For scientific and experi-
mental approaches to the interval between one aspect and the other, see for 
example Jürgen Kornmeier, Wahrnehmungswechsel bei mehrdeutigen Bildern – 
EEG-Messungen zum Zeitverlauf neuronaler Mechanismen (Freiburg: Fakultät 
für Biologie der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 2002).
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchun-
gen), trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, reissued 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
 
 S P L I T T I N G  I M A G E S 87
pp. 194–207. Wittgenstein’s drawing of the figure is reproduced in fig. 4 of 
Christine Hentschel’s paper in this volume.
11 The difference between the ‘whole’ and the ‘aspect’ is arguably analogous to 
Wittgenstein’s difference between ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing as’: ‘It would have made as 
little sense for me to say “Now I am seeing it as…” as to say at the sight of knife 
and fork “Now I am seeing this as a knife or a fork”’ (ibid., p. 195). It may also 
be connected to Sara Fortuna’s difference between two different notions of 
aspectuality, which she defines by ‘et-et’ and ‘aut-aut’. Her ‘et-et’ model might be 
analogous to what I define here as a whole, while the ‘aut-aut’ model seems to 
be similar to my notion of relativized aspects. See Sara Fortuna, Wittgensteins 
Philosophie des Kippbilds: Aspektwechsel, Ethik, Sprache (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 
2012). I thank Christoph Holzhey for this indication. For another reading of the 
Wittgenstein quote, see the article by Beau Madison Mount in this volume. 
12 The German word Teilaspekte connects the notions of aspect and of part. 
13 ‘That is to say: the weird movement called “drive” is not driven by the “impossi-
ble” quest for the lost object; it is a push to enact “loss” – the gap, cut, distance 
– itself directly.’ See Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2006), p. 60.
14 Quoted from the English Standard Version. See also Gal 1, 23 or 1 Cor 15.
15 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans, trans. by Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 
23.
16 In this sense, instead of describing Agamben’s Messianism as empty, as Vivian 
Liska has suggested in the beautiful book Giorgio Agambens leerer Messianis-
mus (Vienna: Schlebrügge, 2008), I would prefer calling it melancholic Messian-
ism.
17 Jacob Taubes, Die politische Theologie des Paulus: Vorträge, gehalten an der 
Forschungsstätte der evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg, 23.–27. 
Februar 1987 (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1993).
18 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003).
19 He defines the ‘new’ of the Christian event (the resurrection), however, as radical 
subtraction ‘[R]esurrection is affirmative subtraction from the path of death’ 
(ibid., p. 73). The decision in favour of a subtraction could be perhaps (but this 
needs a careful reading) identified with what I described earlier as death-drive, 
the decision in favour of the split leading to its empowering transformation into 
something we can perform (rather than something we have to endure). This at 
least seems the direction in which Slavoj Žižek interprets Paul. See for example 
Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
20 Walter Benjamin, Abhandlungen, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf Tiede-
mann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1991), I.2, p. 706.
 
  
Luca Di Blasi, ‘Splitting Images: Understanding Irreversible Frac-
tures throughAspectChange’, inMultistable Figures:On theCritical
Potential of Ir/Reversible Aspect-Seeing, ed. by Christoph F. E.
Holzhey, Cultural Inquiry, 8 (Vienna: Turia +Kant, 2014), pp. 67–
87 <https://doi.org/10.37050/ci-08_04>
REFERENCES
Agamben, Giorgio, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by
Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005)
Badiou, Alain, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003)
Benjamin, Walter, Abhandlungen, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann
Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991)
Di Blasi, Luca, ‘One Divided by Another: Split and Conversion in Pasolini’s San Paolo’, in The
Scandal of Self-Contradiction: Pasolini’s Multistable Subjectivities, Traditions, Geographies,
ed. by Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gragnolati, and Christoph F. E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia
+ Kant, 2012), pp. 189–207 <https://doi.org/10.37050/ci-06_11>
Fortuna, Sara,Wittgensteins Philosophie des Kippbilds: Aspektwechsel, Ethik, Sprache (Vienna: Turia
+ Kant, 2012)
Goppelsröder, Fabian, Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen: Wittgensteins Weg von der literarischen zur
dichtenden Philosophie (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007) <https://doi.org/10.14361/
9783839407646>
Kornmeier, Jürgen, Wahrnehmungswechsel bei mehrdeutigen Bildern – EEG-Messungen zum
Zeitverlauf neuronaler Mechanismen (Freiburg: Fakultät für Biologie der Albert-Ludwigs-
Universität Freiburg, 2002)
Liska, Vivian,Giorgio Agambens leerer Messianismus (Vienna: Schlebrügge, 2008)
Luhmann, Niklas, ‘The Paradox of Form’, in Problems of Form, ed. by Dirk Baecker (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 16–26
Malevich, Kasimir, ‘FromCubism and Futurism to Suprematism:TheNew Realism in Painting’, in
Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. by Charles Harrison and
Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 166–76
Martin, Lillien J., ‘Über die Abhängigkeit visueller Vorstellungsbilder vom Denken. Eine exper-
imentelle Untersuchung’, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I.
Abteilung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 70.3–4 (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1914-
15), pp. 212–75
Rubin, Edgar, Synsoplevede Figurer: Studier i psykologisk Analyse (København: Gyldendal, 1915)
Spencer-Brown, George, Laws of Form (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979)
Taubes, Jacob,Die politischeTheologie des Paulus: Vorträge, gehalten an der Forschungsstätte der evan-
gelischen Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg, 23.–27. Februar 1987 (München: Wilhelm
Fink, 1993)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen), trans. by G. E.
M. Anscombe, reissued 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
Žižek, Slavoj,The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) <https://doi.org/10.7551/
mitpress/5231.001.0001>
The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2003) <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5706.001.0001>
R-1
